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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the effects of auditor-client disagreement disclosure on auditor resignations and audit fee 
charged by successor auditors. Using a matched sample of auditor changes over the period 2003-2016, we find that 
auditor resignations are more often accompanied by auditor-client disagreements. We also find that Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to resign from their engagements when they disagree with their clients. Further, we document that 
successor auditors charge higher audit fees for firms that have disagreements with their predecessor auditors. Relative 
to non-Big 4 auditors, Big 4 successor auditors charge even higher audit fee for disagreement firms.    
 
Keywords: Auditor-Client Disagreement; Audit Resignation; Audit Fee 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
n 1971, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required public companies to report any change 
of independent auditor along with a disclosure of any auditor-client disagreement on Form 8-K (SEC, 
1971).1 The 8-K regulatory requirements suggest that regulators believe that auditor-client disagreements 
are important “reportable events” that require public dissemination because market participants are likely to benefit 
from this information. Prior studies document a significantly negative market reaction surrounding the announcement 
date of auditor change or disagreement (Eichenseher, Hagigi & Shields, 1989; Smith & Nichols 1982; Dhaliwal, 
Schatzberg & Trombley, 1993; Beneish, Hopkins, Jansen & Martin, 2005) Despite the importance of auditor-client 
disagreements, relatively few studies focus on the antecedents and precedents of auditor-client disagreements. In this 
paper, we investigate how auditors react to auditor-client disagreements. Specifically, we examine whether auditor-
client disagreements are more likely to associate with: (1) auditor resignations, (2) more frequent Big 4 auditor 
resignations, and (3) higher audit fees charged by successor auditors. 
 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1993) suggest that an auditor-client disagreement usually occurs when the auditor objects to 
a controversial accounting procedure that the management uses or proposes to use. On one hand, a disagreement might 
get resolved if a manager updates his position on an accounting issue to a compromised position during the auditor-
client negotiation. On the other hand, a disagreement might get resolved because the auditor is willing to discuss and 
compromise on the interpretations of some imprecise accounting standards (Nelson et al. 2002).  In other instances, 
even though auditor-client disagreement may not be resolved, auditors may not view such disagreements as adverse 
and therefore concede to client’s reporting preferences. Thus, no switch of auditor occurs, and the auditor-client 
disagreement is not required to be disclosed in Form 8-K. However, when risk of material misstatement is high, 
auditor-client disagreement might precipitate auditor resignations.  
 
Our results are based on a treatment sample of auditor-client disagreements and control sample of auditor changes 
over the period 2003-2016. We identify 1,761 disagreement sample observations (treatment firm observations) from 
 
1 Auditor-client disagreement is defined as disputes occurring between the client firm and audit firm involving accounting principles or practices, 
financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedures (SEC, 1974).  
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the audit change database and match 1,761 auditor change control sample observations (control firm observations) by 
using the propensity score-matching method by closest industry and year.  
 
We perform a logistic regression analysis using the auditor resignation as the dependent variable to examine whether 
disagreements are associated with auditor resignations. Defond and Jiambalvo (1993) find that firms disagreeing with 
their auditors are more likely to manipulate earnings than other firms. The risk of material misstatement is high when 
firms manage earnings (Hirst, 1994). Thus, disagreement firms are more likely to have higher risk of material 
misstatement. The occurrence of disagreements might suggest even higher risk and provide incremental information 
to the predecessor auditors. The asymmetric information of disagreement between predecessor and successor auditors 
may cause the successor auditors to inappropriately underbid the audit. If predecessor auditors expect the 
underbidding, they may resign rather than incur the cost of bidding. Due to the underbidding or high litigation risk, 
predecessor auditors are more likely to resign from the engagements. We find a significant positive relation between 
auditor-client disagreement and auditor resignation. The result suggests that auditor resignations are more often 
accompanied by auditor-client disagreement disclosure.  
 
Further, we examine the impact of disagreements on Big 4 auditors’ client retention decisions by including a 
Big4_PRE indicator variable and an interaction variable between Big 4 and the disagreement indicator variable 
(BIG4_PRE and BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE) in our logistic regression model. Since large auditors have “deeper 
pockets” and higher reputation than small auditors, they are more likely to suffer greater losses from an audit failure 
(Feltham, Hughes & Simunic, 1991; Clarkson & Simunic, 1994). Thus, large auditors are more sensitive to 
engagement risk. Further, large auditors are less likely to acquiesce to client’s preferred accounting choices. It is easier 
for large auditors to replace a risky client because they have a larger client base and face less intense competition in 
the audit industry (DeAngelo, 1981; Lennox, 1999; Ghosh & Lustgarten, 2006). Therefore, we predict and find that 
Big 4 auditors are more likely to resign from their engagements when they disagree with their clients. 
 
Last, we investigate how successor auditors determine their audit fees when they accept new clients that have 
disagreements with their predecessor auditors. Prior studies document that audit fees are mainly determined by the 
cost of the external audit efforts and auditor’s expected loss from litigation (Simunic, 1980). Relative to non-
disagreement firms, disagreement firms are more likely to have earning manipulations and higher risk of material 
misstatement. Thus, successor auditors are more likely to charge disagreement firms with higher audit fee. We find 
that successor auditors are more likely to charge their clients with higher audit fees if these clients have auditor-client 
disagreements with their predecessor auditors. Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, Big 4 auditors charge even higher audit 
fees for new clients who have disagreements with their predecessor auditors. 
 
We contribute to the auditor disagreement literature in several ways. First, we enrich the literature on auditor change 
and auditor-client disagreement by documenting auditor resignations are more often accompanied by auditor-client 
disagreement disclosure. Unlike other studies that examine auditor changes (Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997), we provide 
a theory explaining that predecessor auditors are more likely to resign from the engagements because the asymmetric 
information of disagreement may cause the successor auditor to underbid the engagements. Second, we extend the 
literature on Big 4 auditors’ client retention decision in the context of auditor-client disagreement. We document that 
Big 4 auditors are more likely to resign from audit engagements when they disagree with their clients. This finding 
also contributes to the auditor change literature by confirming that Big 4 auditors have more stringent client retention 
policies than non-Big 4 auditors (Rama & Read, 2006). Finally, we document that successor auditors, including Big 
4 and non-Big 4 auditors, are more likely to charge their new clients higher audit fee if their clients have auditor-client 
disagreement with predecessor auditors. This finding suggests that successor auditors perceive disagreement as a 
signal of high risk of material misstatement and litigation risk.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the auditor disagreement and auditor 
resignation literatures and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the research design and the data. Section IV 
presents the testing results and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2020 Volume 36, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 17 The Clute Institute 
II.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Auditor Resignation 
 
In 1971, the SEC required public companies to report any change of independent auditor and disclose any auditor-
client disagreement that had occurred within 18 months prior to the auditor change on form 8-K (SEC, 1971).2 The 
disagreement disclosure requirement was expanded in Accounting Series Release (ASR) 165 to include disagreement 
that occurred during the two most recent fiscal years and any subsequent interim period following the auditor change 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 1974). In addition, in case of an auditor change, ASR 165 required the 
predecessor auditor to disclose any auditor-client disagreement in the auditor’s report if disagreement is not resolved 
to the auditor’s satisfaction and to submit a letter that states its agreement or disagreement regarding the content of 
the Form 8-K filed by the client (SEC, 1974).  
 
Antle and Nalebuff (1991) suggest that financial statements should be viewed as a joint statement from the auditor 
and management because it is the outcome of negotiations and bargaining between management and the auditor. 
During the auditor-client negotiation, a disagreement is more likely to be resolved if a manager updates his position 
on an accounting issue to a more compromised position. However, prior studies document that management might 
prefer adopting income-increasing accounting methods because of incentives to increase compensation and bonus 
awards, to increase job security, and to mitigate potential violation of debt covenants (Dhaliwal et al. 1993; Defond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy & Wahlen 1999). Even though management might prefer higher reported income, the 
firm bears substantial costs when challenging the auditor’s position. For instance, because the negotiation process 
lengthens the auditing process, it inevitably leads to higher audit fee. Also, challenging auditor’s position might result 
in an auditor resignation. Disclosing auditor resignation to the public might be costly because investors react 
negatively to auditor resignations (Wells & Loudder, 1997; Shu, 2000; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy & 
Raghunandan, 2003).  
 
While the client prefers aggressive reporting, in sharp contrast, the auditor usually prefers conservative accounting 
choices as a protection against future litigation and the potential damages arising from aggressive reporting (DeFond 
& Subramanyam 1998; Reynolds & Francis, 2000). For instance, Francis and Krishnan (1999) document that auditors 
lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports as a way to protect themselves from audit failure when their 
client has a high accrual. Also, auditors are more likely to resign from the engagement when litigation risk is high 
(Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997). However, auditors are also aware that excessive conservatism might lead to auditor 
dismissal. If management believes the incumbent auditor is more conservative than a successor auditor, management 
may want to dismiss the incumbent auditor with the expectation of replacing the incumbent auditor with a less 
conservative successor auditor.  
 
An auditor-client disagreement usually occurs when auditor objects to a controversial accounting procedure that the 
management uses or proposes to use (Defond & Jiambalvo, 1993). The interpretation of complicated, imprecise, and 
controversial reporting standards might lead to ambiguity in reporting which could result in disagreement on the 
reporting of certain business transactions. Some of the auditor-client disagreements might get resolved through 
auditor-client negotiation because auditors are more likely to compromise in the auditor-client negotiations when 
accounting standards are imprecise (Nelson et al. 2002). In some other instances, even though auditor-client 
disagreement may not be resolved, auditors may not view such disagreements as adverse. However, when clients have 
high risk of material misstatement, auditors are less likely acquiesce to clients’ positions and might even consider 
resigning from the engagements.  
 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1993) find that clients disagreeing with their auditors are more likely to manipulate earnings 
than other firms. Hirst (1994) documents that the risk of material misstatement increases when firms manage earnings. 
Thus, firms with auditor-client disagreements are more likely to have high risk of material misstatement. When a 
client’s risk of material misstatement is high, the auditor usually expends more audit effort (e.g. extensive substantive 
test) to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level, which increases audit fees. Thus, fees are likely to be high for clients 
that disagree with their auditors. 
 
2 Auditor-client disagreement is only required to be disclosed in Form 8-K that filed with the SEC when there is a change in auditor. 
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On one hand, disagreements might provide auditors with incremental information which might lead to a reassessment 
of audit risk for the incumbent auditor. There is potential that the asymmetric information of disagreement between 
predecessor and successor auditors may cause the successor auditors to inappropriately underbid the audit. If the 
predecessor auditors anticipate the underbidding, they may resign rather than incur the costs of bidding. Also, if the 
risk of material misstatement is assessed too high for auditors after the disagreement, predecessor auditors may resign 
from the engagements because of the high litigation risk. On the other hand, disagreement might lead to auditor 
dismissal. Prior literature document that the clients may choose to dismiss the auditors if they receive qualified opinion 
(Krishnan, Krishnan, & Stephens, 1996). Thus, client disagreed with their auditors may dismiss their predecessor 
auditor to change a different auditor that will agree with them. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is no significant relationship between auditor change and auditor-client disagreement. 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Large Auditors 
 
Prior studies document that large auditors provide higher levels of audit quality than small auditors (e.g., DeAngelo 
1981; Teoh & Wong, 1993; Krishnan, 2003; Wagner, 2012).  Audit quality is higher for large auditors because they 
have reputational concerns and greater exposure to litigation risk than small auditors. Since large auditors have “deeper 
pockets” and more wealth at risk, they are likely to suffer greater losses from an audit failure (Feltham et al. 1991; 
Clarkson & Simunic, 1994). Therefore, large auditors are more sensitive to material misstatement in financial reports. 
In addition, because of deeper pockets, large auditors have more resources to invest in technology, personnel and 
training which results in higher audit quality. Thus, large auditors are more sensitive to engagement risk and are less 
likely to acquiesce to client’s preferred accounting choices.  
 
DeAngelo (1981) and Lennox (1999) document that the audit market is segmented with a few large auditors having 
many clients while many small auditors compete for a smaller client base. Since large auditors have a large client 
base, it is rare that resigning from one risky client may have a large impact on their total revenue. However, a single 
client can constitute a major source of revenue for small auditors. In addition, Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) find that 
large auditors face less intense competition in finding a new client because they dominate the oligopolistic segment 
of the audit industry. They also find that audit fee discounting is less extensive for large auditors in this segment. 
Relative to small auditors, large auditors are likely to find it easier to replace a risky client. Thus, large auditors are 
more likely to resign when they disagree with their clients. Therefore, we predict that Big 4 auditors have more 
stringent client retention policies than non-Big 4 auditors, which suggests that they are less likely to acquiesce to client 
pressure in case of a disagreement. 
 
H2: Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, Big 4 auditors are more likely to resign from their audit engagements when they 
disagree with their clients on accounting matters. 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Audit Fees charged by Successor Auditors 
 
In prior studies, the auditors’ fee determination is explained in the following model: E(C)=cq +E(d|a, q)E(θ), where 
cq is the cost of the external audit efforts and E(d|a, q)E(θ) is the auditor’s expected loss from litigation (Simunic, 
1980). When a client’s risk of material misstatement is high, the auditor usually expends more audit effort (e.g. 
extensive substantive test) to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level, which increases audit fees. In addition, higher 
risk of material misstatement and earning manipulations are more likely to increase the probability of litigation, which 
also increases audit fees. Relative to non-disagreement firms, disagreement firms are more likely to have higher risk, 
earning manipulations, and aggressive accounting reporting practice. Thus, successor auditors are more likely to 
charge disagreement firms with higher audit fee. The following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H3: Successor auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees for client firms that have disagreement with their 
predecessor auditors. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Regression Models 
 
To examine the association between auditor change and auditor-client disagreement, we perform a logistic regression 
analysis using a sample of disagreement firms and matched control firms. The dependent variable is auditor resignation 
that is an indicator variable equal to one if auditors resign from the engagements. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁) = 𝛽/ + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽>𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽@𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽B𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽D𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆 + 𝛽E𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽1/𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽11𝐼𝐶𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 +𝛽16𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽19𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑍 + 𝜀  
 
where,  
 
RESIGN = 1 if auditors resigned from the engagements, and 0 otherwise; 
DISAGREE = 1 if firms are identified with disagreement in the auditor change database, and 0 otherwise; 
FEE = Audit service fees as a percentage of firm total assets; 
LEVERAGE = The ratio of total debt to total assets; 
GROWTH = Growth in sales (scaled by prior year sales) in the year prior to the auditor change; 
TENURE = Number of years of auditor tenure; 
SIZE = Natural Logarithm of total assets 
GCONCERN = 1 if the auditor opinion has a going-concern modification, and 0 otherwise; 
ACCRUALS = Firm's abnormal accruals in the fiscal year prior to the auditor change; 
REPEVENT = 1 if firms reported reportable events in their auditor change, and 0 otherwise; 
MODOP = 1 if the auditor opinion is modified opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
ICWEAKNESS = 1 if firms are identified with a material internal control weakness, and 0 otherwise; 
LOSS = 1 if firm's net earnings is less than zero, and 0 otherwise; 
REPLAG = Number of days from firms’ fiscal year-end to audit report date. 
ALTZ = Decile 1 to 10 ranked by Altman Z score;3 
 
DISAGREE is the main variable of interest in this model. We control for audit opinion (MODOP) since Lys and Watts 
(1994) suggest that a modified opinion may increase the likelihood of auditor resignation if the qualification pertains 
to an error that occurred in prior year. We also control for reportable events (REPEVENT) and going concern opinions 
(GCONCERN) because Whisenant et al. (2003) find that these items discriminate between auditor resignations and 
dismissals. Following prior studies (Stice, 1991; Johnson, Khurana & Reynolds, 2002), we include variables TENURE 
and FEE to control for auditor independence and objectivity. We also control for audit report lag (REPLAG) because 
Mande and Son (2011) document that auditors are more likely to resign from clients with long audit report lag. In 
addition, motivated by prior studies (Stice, 1991; Krishnan & Krishnan 1997; Defond, Ettredge & Smith, 1997), we 
include variables controlling for client business risk (LOSS, LEVERAGE, GROWTH, ACCRUALS, ALTZ) in the 
model. Finally, variable SIZE is included to control for client firm size. 
 
In order to examine the impact of disagreement on Big 4 auditors’ client retention decision, we add two variables 
(BIG4_PRE and BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE) in the logistic regression model.  Variable BIG4_PRE equals 1 if firms’ 
predecessor auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. The variable BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE is the interaction term 
of two variables BIG4_PRE and DISAGREE. We estimate the following regression: 
  
 
3 Since Hamer (1983) documents the various models in the financial health literature (e.g., Ohlson, 1980; Blum, 1974) do not significantly differ 
in predicting business failure, Altman Z score is used as the measurement of a company's financial condition. (Altman & McGough, 1974).  
Altman's Z score is computed as: Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 
where: X1 = (current assets - current liabilities)/total assets, X2  = retained earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = market value of equity/total liabilities, and X5 = sales/total assets. 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁) = 𝛽/ + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺4_𝑃𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4_𝑃𝑅𝐸 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐸𝐸 +𝛽>𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽@𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽B𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽D𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽E𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽1/𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 +𝛽14𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽16𝐼𝐶𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽19𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽1>𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽1@𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑍 + 𝜀  
 
Lastly, we examine how successor auditors react to auditor-client disagreement in term of audit pricing using a sample 
of treatment firms (firms have disagreement with their predecessor auditors) and control firms (firms have no 
disagreement with their predecessor auditors). We perform an ordinary least square regression analysis using the audit 
fee as the dependent variable. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
 𝐹𝐸𝐸 = 𝛽/ + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺4_𝑆𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽>𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 +𝛽@𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽B𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽D𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽E𝐵𝐼𝐺4_𝑆𝑈𝐶 + 𝛽1/𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽14𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝜀  
 
In the above model, we investigate whether disagreement firms are more likely to pay higher audit fees to their 
successor auditors. We also include an interaction term BIG4_SUC*DISAGREE in the model to examine what is 
large auditors’ pricing strategy on firms have disagreements with their predecessor auditors. We include measures to 
capture client firm size, characteristics and business risk (SIZE, LEVERAGE, CURASSETS, ROA, and LOSS), which 
prior studies have shown to be positively associated with audit fee (Simunic 1980; Newton & Ashton 1989). We also 
control for some auditor attributes including auditor resignation (RESIGN), auditor quality (BIG4_SUC), audit 
opinion (GCONCERN and MODOP), and engagement attribute (REPLAG). 
 
Sample Selection 
 
For our analyses, the initial sample includes all auditor changes observations from Audit Analytics’ Auditor Changes 
file for the period 2003-2016. The going concern opinion data are from Audit Analytics’ Audit Opinion file. Firms’ 
financial data are from Compustat Annual files. Table 1 presents the sample selection for the disagreement sample 
and the control group sample for auditor change. First, we obtain 9,568 auditors change observations from Audit 
Analytics after it is merged with the Compustat data by CIK number. Second, we identify 1,761 disagreement 
observations (treatment firm observations) from the audit change database using variables of 
“Auditor_company_disagreement”, “Dismissed_Auditor_Disagreement”, and “Issue_Accounting”.4 Among the 
1,761 disagreement observations, there are 578 auditor resignations and 1,183 auditor dismissals. For the 7,807 non-
disagreement observations, there are 2,207 auditor resignations and 5,600 auditor dismissals. Third, we use the 
propensity score-matching method to match the disagreement observations with non-disagreement auditor change 
observations (control firm observations) without replacement by closest industry and year. The final sample includes 
1,761 disagreement firm observations and 1,761 auditor change control firm observations. 
 
 
  
 
4 Prior studies argue that management and auditor might have incentives to underreport the actual occurrence of disagreement (Smith & Nichols, 
1982; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1993). Defond and Jiambalvo (1993) argue that management might underreport disagreement if he believes such 
disclosure will have a negative impact on firm performance; and that auditors may underreport disagreement if they believe reporting disagreement 
will make them less attractive to potential clients. Thus, we use these variables to identify disagreement observations. 
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Table 1. Auditor Change Observations from Audit Analytics merged with Compustat by CIK (2003-2016) 
Description Sample Selection Sample Size 
Disagreement firm observations:   
Resignation 578  
Dismissal 1,183 1,761 
Non-Disagreement firm observations:   
Resignation 2,207  
Dismissal 5,600 7,807 
Total auditor changes observations:  9,568 
Final disagreement firm observations:  1,761 
Final control firm observations:  1,761 
Total final sample observations:  3,552 
Notes: Table 1 presents the sample selection for the disagreement sample and the control group sample for auditor change. First, we obtain 9,568 
auditor change observations from Audit Analytics after it is merged with the Compustat data by CIK from period 2003-2016. Second, we identify 
1,761 disagreement observations (treatment firm observations) from the audit change database using variables of 
“Auditor_company_disagreement”, “Dismissed_Auditor_Disagreement”, and “Issue_Accounting”. Third, we use the propensity score-matching 
method to match the disagreement observations with non-disagreement auditor change observations (control firm observations) without 
replacement by closest industry and year. The final sample includes 1,761 disagreement firm observations and 1,761 auditor change control firm 
observations. 
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables for the disagreement sample and the control auditor change 
sample. The result shows that disagreement firms are more likely to have audit resignation than control firms. We find 
that disagreement firms have significantly longer audit report lag and pay higher audit fee. Fee might be higher because 
of greater audit effort to cover added litigation risk.5 Auditors usually input more audit effort (e.g. extensive 
substantive test) and need more time to perform the engagement when risk of material misstatement is high. 
Disagreement firms are more likely to receive modified audit opinion and going concern opinion, which suggests high 
risk of material misstatement because their financial statements are more likely to contain material misstatements. Iyer 
and Rama (2004) find that management is more likely to employ income-increasing accounting practices when audit 
tenure is short. Prior studies document that poor performance increases the likelihood that managers make aggressive 
accounting and reporting choices (Petroni, 1992; Sweeney, 1994; Beneish, 1997). Since both income-increasing 
accounting practices and aggressive accounting choices might lead to higher risk of material misstatements, 
disagreement firms are associated with higher risk because they have shorter audit tenure and higher probability of 
loss. In addition, disagreement firms have a significantly higher probability of reportable events and internal control 
weakness, suggesting that these firms have less effective and less reliable internal control system. In a word, the results 
suggest that disagreement firms have significantly higher risk of material misstatement than control firms in the year 
prior to the auditor change. 
 
 
  
 
5 Simunic (1980) models auditors’ fee determination as a function of costs of the internal accounting system, external audit, and expected litigation 
loss using the following model: E(C)=cq +E(d|a, q)E(θ), where cq is the cost of the external audit and E(d|a, q)E(θ) is the auditor’s expected loss 
from litigation. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Control Sample Disagreement Sample 
Variables Mean Observations Mean Observations Difference t-value 
RESIGN 0.2737 1,761 0.3282 1,761 -0.0545 -3.5319*** 
BIG4_PRE 0.4208 1,761 0.5423 1,761 -0.1215 -7.2687*** 
FEE 12.2984 1,689 12.7602 1,662 -0.4618 -7.9442 
LEVERAGE 0.5434 1,644 0.5318 1,652 0.0116 0.2445 
GROWTH 0.1966 1,314 0.2760 1,288 -0.0793 -1.7579* 
TENURE 5.1221 1,761 4.0897 1,761 1.0324 8.8555*** 
SIZE 4.0797 1,654 4.2961 1,663 -0.2164 -2.0186** 
GCONCERN 0.2397 1,727 0.2830 1,682 -0.0433 -2.8787*** 
ACCRUALS -0.1075 1,378 -0.1898 1,341 0.0823 1.4996 
REPEVENT 0.0148 1,761 0.7984 1,761 -0.7836 -78.4766*** 
ICWEAKNESS 0.0091 1,761 0.7200 1,761 -0.7110 -64.9964*** 
MODOP 0.4260 1,662 0.5587  1,652 -0.1327 -7.7074*** 
LOSS 0.4639 1,761 0.5934 1,761 -0.1295 -7.5173*** 
REPLAG 96.8419 1,727 116.4310 1,682 -19.5891 -8.0456*** 
ALTZ 4.9728 1,360 4.6647 1,333 0.3081 2.6887*** 
Notes: All firm financial variables are defined and calculated in the fiscal year prior to the auditor change. They are winsorized at the 1% level 
each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 3, we present the Pearson correlations between the variables used in the regression. We document positive 
and significant correlations between auditor resignation and auditor-client disagreement.  
 
 
Table 3. Correlations between variables in regressions 
  RESIGN DISAGREE BIG4_PRE FEE LEVERAGE GROWTH TENURE SIZE 
RESIGN 1        
DISAGREE 0.0594 1       
BIG4_PRE -0.1628 0.1216 1      
FEE -0.16 0.136 0.5648 1     
LEVERAGE 0.0532 -0.0038 -0.1931 -0.267 1    
GROWTH -0.0299 0.0345 -0.0781 -0.0546 -0.0185 1   
TENURE -0.0323 -0.1479 0.0522 0.1186 0.0293 -0.0497 1  
SIZE -0.1662 0.035 0.5236 0.8325 -0.4256 -0.0479 0.0935 1 
GCONCERN 0.1088 0.0493 -0.3618 -0.4431 0.3861 0.0782 -0.0669 -0.5621 
ACCRUALS -0.0156 -0.0286 0.1183 0.1101 -0.1847 -0.0457 0.0073 0.1649 
REPEVENT -0.0113 0.7977 0.122 0.1719 -0.0176 0.0253 -0.1017 0.0678 
ICWEAKNESS -0.0301 0.7386 0.185 0.2514 -0.0438 0.02 -0.111 0.1111 
MODOP 0.0577 0.1327 -0.0525 -0.0938 0.2176 0.0133 -0.1148 -0.2225 
LOSS 0.0801 0.1297 -0.1817 -0.1891 0.1907 0.0397 -0.0277 -0.4237 
REPLAG 0.0727 0.1365 -0.1202 -0.1349 0.1285 0.0154 -0.1421 -0.1899 
ALTZ -0.0777 -0.0519 0.1523 0.1789 -0.3529 -0.0118 -0.0048 0.3514 
 
 GCONCERN ACCRUALS REPEVENT IC-WEAKNESS MODOP LOSS REPLAG ALTZ 
GCONCERN 1        
ACCRUALS -0.1892 1       
REPEVENT 0.0065 -0.0259 1      
ICWEAKNESS -0.0478 -0.0099 0.8022 1     
MODOP 0.523 -0.1278 0.0824 0.0677 1    
LOSS 0.361 -0.1726 0.1065 0.1196 0.2389 1   
REPLAG 0.1716 -0.0518 0.0991 0.0796 0.1439 0.1441 1  
ALTZ -0.4836 0.1473 -0.0339 -0.0255 -0.3052 -0.4585 -0.1836 1 
Note: Table 3 presents the correlations between variables in regressions. Correlations in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. Please see 
Appendix A for the variable definitions.  
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Main Results 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Auditor Resignation 
 
Table 4 reports the results from the logistic model that estimates the effect of auditor-client disagreements on auditor 
resignations. The dependent variable is coded 1 for auditor resignations and 0 for auditor dismissal. We report two 
regression models for the resignation analysis in Table 4. In both models, we find a significantly positive relation 
between auditor-client disagreement and auditor resignation. The results provide evidence that auditors are more likely 
to resign from their engagements when they have disagreements with their clients. In model (2), the coefficients for 
FEE, GROWTH, and TENURE are significantly negative, suggesting that auditors are less likely to resign from clients 
who pay higher audit fee, clients who are growing, and clients with longer tenure. The significant negative coefficients 
on internal control weakness suggest that client firms are more likely to dismiss their auditors in cases of receiving an 
internal control weakness report. The probability that an auditor will resign rather than be dismissed is higher 
following the issuance of a going-concern opinion. Consistent with Mande and Son (2011), we find that auditors are 
more likely to resign from clients with long audit report lag.  
 
 
Table 4. Auditor Resignation Logistic Regression 
 
(1) 
Resignation 
(2) 
Resignation 
 Coefficients Z Coefficients Z 
Test Variable:   
DISAGREE 0.2597 3.52*** 0.9683 5.55*** 
Control Variables:   
FEE   -0.2122 -3.19*** 
LEVERAGE   -0.0692 -1.46 
GROWTH   -0.1051 -2.29** 
TENURE   -0.0297 -2.02** 
SIZE   -0.0294 -0.68 
GCONCERN   0.4961 2.97*** 
ACCRUALS   0.0785 1.69* 
REPEVENT   -0.2428 -1.25 
ICWEAKNESS   -0.4765 -2.58*** 
MODOP   -0.1748 -1.46 
LOSS   0.1482 1.23 
REPLAG   0.0013 1.83* 
ALTZ   0.0098 0.45 
Intercept -0.9759 -18.26*** 1.7015 2.35** 
Pseudo R2 0.003  0.056  
No. of obs. 3,522  2,142  
Notes: This table shows the results of logistic regression of auditor resignation and auditor-client disagreement. All control variables are measured 
in the fiscal year prior to the auditor change. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please 
see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Large Auditors 
 
Table 5 presents the result of the logistic regression of Big 4 auditor resignation and auditor-client disagreement. By 
including the interaction variable (BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE) in the regression, we test whether Big 4 auditors are more 
likely to resign from their audit engagements when they disagree with their clients on accounting matters. The 
coefficient of the interaction term BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE is significantly positive while the coefficient on variable 
Big4_PRE is negatively significant. The results suggest that Big 4 auditors are less likely to resign from their client 
than non-Big 4 auditors. However, in circumstances of disagreement, Big 4 auditors are more likely to resign from 
their audit engagements than non-Big 4 auditors. One explanation for this finding is that Big 4 auditors become more 
conservative after Sarbanes-Oxley Act and more selective in accepting new client (e.g. larger clients, low risk clients), 
which results in less auditor resignations (Rama & Reed, 2006). However, in case of audit-client disagreement, Big 4 
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auditors are more likely to resign because they are more sensitive to engagement risk and are less likely to acquiesce 
to client’s preferred accounting choices.  
 
 
Table 5. Big 4 Auditors Resignation Logistic Regression 
  Coefficients Z 
Test Variables: 
DISAGREE 0.5839 3.15*** 
BIG4_PRE*DISAGREE 1.2458 5.67***    
Control Variables: 
BIG4_PRE -1.3993 -7.73*** 
FEE -0.1137 -1.63 
LEVERAGE -0.0637 -1.35 
GROWTH -0.1209 -2.63*** 
TENURE -0.0377 -2.5*** 
SIZE -0.0136 -0.31 
GCONCERN 0.4783 2.83*** 
ACCRUALS 0.0813 1.77* 
REPEVENT -0.2636 -1.36 
ICWEAKNESS -0.5269 -2.84*** 
MODOP -0.1549 -1.27 
LOSS 0.1408 1.15 
REPLAG 0.0009 1.32 
ALTZ 0.0108 0.49 
Intercept 0.9574 1.26 
Pseudo R2 0.082  
No. of obs. 2,142  
Notes: This table shows the results of logistic regression of Big4 auditor resignation and auditor-client disagreement. All control variables are 
measured in the fiscal year prior to the auditor change. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. 
Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Auditor-Client Disagreement and Audit Fees 
 
In Table 6, we investigate the effect of auditor-client disagreement on audit fees charged by successor auditors between 
disagreement firms and non-disagreement firms. In Model (1), the coefficient of DISAGREE is positively significant 
after controlling for firm level characteristics, business risk factors, and audit and engagement attributes. We find that 
successor auditors are more likely to charge their clients with higher audit fees if these clients have auditor-client 
disagreements with their prior auditors. The results suggest that disagreement firms are more likely to have higher risk 
of material misstatement and litigation risk than control firms, thus successor auditors incorporate this risk factor in 
their pricing and charge higher audit fees. In Model (2), we include an interaction term of BIG4_SUC*DISAGREE 
to investigate how Big 4 auditors will determine their audit fees for clients with audit-client disagreements. We have 
a positively significant coefficient for the interaction term, which shows that Big 4 successor auditors are more likely 
to charge even higher audit fees for firms with prior auditor-client disagreements. Prior studies document that Big 4 
auditors face less intense competition in finding a new client and audit fee discounting is less extensive for large 
auditors (Ghosh & Lustgarten, 2006). Thus, Big 4 auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees for disagreement 
firms to compensate their potential high litigation risk. Consistent with prior studies, we find auditors are more likely 
to charge higher audit fees for larger clients, clients with high business risk and audit risk. The audit fees charged by 
Big 4 auditors are higher than non-Big 4 auditors.  
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Table 6. Audit Fees and Auditor-client Disagreement 
 
(1) 
Audit Fee 
(2) 
Audit Fee 
 Coefficients t-Statistics Coefficients t-Statistics 
Test Variable: 
DISAGREE 0.2232 7.3*** 0.1871 5.33*** 
BIG4_SUC*DISAGREE   0.1449 2.08**      
Control Variables: 
RESIGN -0.0530 -1.54 -0.0553 -1.61 
SIZE 0.5478 61.98*** 0.5487 62.05*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0509 3.42*** 0.0513 3.45*** 
CURASSETS 0.5043 8.56*** 0.5066 8.61*** 
ROA -0.0756 -12.36*** -0.0759 -12.4*** 
LOSS 0.1712 4.92*** 0.1724 4.96*** 
BIG4_SUC 0.3085 7.54*** 0.2293 4.11*** 
GCONCERN -0.0646 -1.18 -0.0608 -1.11 
MODOP 0.2262 5.87*** 0.2234 5.8*** 
REPLAG 0.0008 3.4*** 0.0008 3.38*** 
Intercept 9.5484 131.91*** 9.5615 131.68*** 
R2 0.784  0.784  
No. of obs. 2,536  2,536  
Notes: This table shows the results of regression of audit fees charged by successor auditors and auditor-client disagreement. All control variables 
are measured in the fiscal year after the auditor change. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. 
Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the effects of auditor-client disagreement disclosure on auditor resignations and audit fee 
charged by successor auditors. This paper studies a sample of disagreement firms and a control sample of auditor 
change firms from the period 2003 to 2016. We document that firms with auditor-client disagreement have high risk 
of material misstatement. Controlling for other known factors affecting the likelihood of auditor resignation, we find 
that auditor resignations are more often accompanied by auditor-client disagreement disclosure. More importantly, we 
also find that disagreement has a greater negative impact on Big 4 auditors’ client retention strategy. Relative to non-
Big 4 auditors, Big 4 auditors are more likely to resign from their audit engagements when they have a disagreement 
with their clients. Lastly, we document that disagreements also have some impacts on audit pricing for successor 
auditors. We find that successor auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees for disagreement firms and the 
audit fees charged by Big 4 successor auditors are even higher. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
RESIGN equals to 1 if auditors resigned from the engagements, and 0 otherwise. 
DISAGREE  equals to 1 if firms are identified with disagreement in the auditor change database, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG4_PRE equals to 1 if firms’ predecessor auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG4_SUC equals to 1 if firms’ successor auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
FEE Audit service fees as a percentage of total assets. 
LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total asset. 
GROWTH Growth in sales (scaled by prior year sales) in the year prior to the auditor change. 
TENURE Number of years of auditor tenure. 
SIZE Natural Logarithm of total assets. 
GCONCERN equals to 1 if the auditor opinion is a going-concern modification,  and 0 otherwise. 
ACCRUALS Firm's abnormal accruals in the fiscal year prior to the auditor change. 
REPEVENT equals to 1 if firms reported reportable events in their auditor change, and 0 otherwise. 
ICWEAKNESS equals to 1 if firms are identified with a material internal control weakness, and 0 otherwise. 
MODOP equals to 1 if the auditor opinion is modified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS 1 if firm's net earnings is less than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
REPLAG Number of days from fiscal year-end to audit report date. 
ALTZ Decile 1 to 10 ranked by Altman Z score. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
 
